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Venturing into the Minefield: 
Turkish Liberal Historiography and 
the Armenian Genocide 
Bedross Der Matossian 
Historiography normally refers to the act of writing history, the collective 
writings of history and the history of such activities over time. I This chapter 
addresses the collective writings of history by a group of scholars of "Turkish 
origin," mainly deriving from a tradition ofleftist sentiments. What is particular 
about this group of Turkish liberal historians is that they provide an alternative 
historical interpretation2 of a specific historical event that is otherwise accepted 
by the official Turkish history (resmi tarih) as an historical travesty.1 
Historical events, which are conventionally regarded as the "building bricks 
of history," are composed into a certain form that acts as a vehicle for the 
creation and representation of historical knowledge and historical explana-
tion.4 In other words, in the writing of history, events are placed into narrative 
form. Historians argue that narrative is important because it is through it that 
we understand the relationship between form and content, the word and the 
world.5 Furthermore, in this process of the creation and the representation of 
historical knowledge and historical explanation it is narrative that transcends 
the geographic, religious, national, ethnic, and cultural boundaries in convey-
ing its messages. Hayden White argues on this point saying: "Far from being 
a problem, then, narrative might well be considered a solution to a problem of 
general human concern, namely, the problem of how to translate knowing into 
telling, the problem of fashioning human experience into a form assailable to 
structures of meaning that are generally human rather than culture-specific .... 
This suggests that far from being one code among many that a culture may uti-
lize for endowing experience with meaning, narrative is a meta-code, a human 
universal on the basis of which trans-cultural messages about the nature of a 
369 
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shared reality can be transmitted."6 The shared reality that is being transmitted 
in this case through the medium of narrative is the historical event of 1915: the 
Armenian Genocide. Though the historical event of 1915 is considered to be a 
"shared reality" for both the "perpetrator group" 7 and the "victimized group," 
it does not mean that both groups have a common consensus or single definition 
and interpretation of this shared reality. Whereas the "victimized group" for 
decades has been fighting for international recognition of the historical event 
itself through using the medium of narrative in its historical explanation, the 
"perpetrator group" has been trying for decades to hinder the reality of the his-
torical event through creating a narrative of its own by using the methodology 
of negation, rationalization, relativization, and trivialization of the Armenian 
Genocide. x Hence, the emergence of a new trend in Turkish historiography that 
provides an alternative interpretation of the historical event of 1915 ought to 
be considered as an important step toward a critical assessment of the state's 
narrative on the historical event of 1915. 
Though an alternative interpretation of the historical event of 1915 or a 
critical assessment of Turkish state narrative on the event is considered to be 
a sound approach, still one needs not forget that histories are always shaped 
by both the perception of the historian and the way the historian would like 
the events to be understood by others through the form of narrative. White 
argues on this point saying "history can never provide the story, rather it is a 
narrative designed by the historian as he/she organizes the contents in the form 
of a narrative of what he/she believes the past was about."9 Furthermore, it is 
the conglomerations of narratives of the historians that constitute an essential 
component in the act of collective writing of history that eventually become 
historiography. Thus, without narrative there can be no reconstruction of the 
past and without historical imagination there can be no history and without 
collective writing of histories there can be no historiography. For White "it is 
the success of narrative in revealing the meaning, coherence, or significance 
of events that attests to the legitimacy of its practice in historiography. And it 
is the success of historiography in narrativizing sets of historical events that 
attests to the 'realism' of narrative itself."lo 
This analysis assesses the contents of the narrative of Turkish liberal histo-
riography on the event of 1915, otherwise known by Turkish liberal scholars as 
soykmm II (genocide), kzyzm 12 (massacre), katliam 13 (massacre), etnik temizlik14 
(ethnic cleansing) and the widely used term by Turkish liberal scholars, kmm l5 
(mass murder). One needs to take into consideration that each of these termi-
nologies that define the historical event have different meanings ranging from 
the magnitude to the premeditated nature of the event. This suggests that the 
employment of different concepts by Turkish liberal historiography in defining 
the historical event of 1915 demonstrates the variety of their treatment of the 
historical event and thus shows their non-monolithic approach, contrary to what 
appears in Turkish official history. 
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However, in order for an account of past events to count as a proper his-
tory, it is not enough that it display all the features of narrativity. White argues 
that "in addition the account must manifest a proper concern for the judicious 
handling of evidence, and it must honor the chronological order of the original 
occurrence of the events of which it treats as a baseline not to be transgrcssed 
in the classification of any given event as either a cause or an effect. ... The 
events must be not only registered within the chronological framework of their 
original occurrence but narrated as well, that is to say, revealed as possessing a 
structure, an order of meaning, that they do not possess as mere sequence."!(' 
Reform, economic advancement, revolt, immigration, nationalism. and 
oppression constitute an essential chronological elements in the narrative of 
Turkish liberal historiography on the event of 1915. Moreover. this series of 
interconnected events constitutes the historical background and the historical 
explanation in the interpretation of the Turkish liberal narrative ofthe deteriora-
tion of the Armeno-Turkish relationship and its culmination in the Armenian 
Genocide. Hence, after discussing these interconnected events in the narrative 
of Turkish liberal historiography on the deterioration of the Armeno-Turkish 
relationship, I will dwell on the concept of causation and contextualization in 
the historical explanation ofthe Armeno-Turkish relationship and then will move 
to discuss the narrative of the event itself through the medium of premedita-
tion-implementation and aftermath. 
Reform 
In his recent book, Taner Ak9am indicates that the real effects of important 
social events can be felt only one hundred years after their occurrence. Based 
on the theory of the German sociologist Norbert Elias,17 Ak9am indicates that 
in order "to understand the Armenian Genocide it is essential to take perspec-
tive of at least a hundred years, back to the beginning of the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire."18 The continuous European pressure on the Ottoman Empire 
in the nineteenth century played a decisive role in the internal administrative 
and legal reforms ofthe Tanzimat period. This was evident in particular with the 
position ofthe Christians and especially the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. 
Though the primary goal ofthese reforms was purely political, that is, to satisfy 
the European powers, this does not mean that there was not an internal will to 
improve the administration and the status ofthe non-Muslim elements living in 
the Ottoman Empire. In addition, these reforms in particular in the provincial 
system aimed at strengthening the control of the center over the periphery and 
consequently a process of centralization began as an ultimate reaction to the 
"dissolution" of the Ottoman Empire. For example, in 1864, a complete overhaul 
of regulations on the organization of provincial government was initiated, a move 
that aimed at bringing the periphery closer to the grip of the center. 
However, the nineteenth-century reforms in the Ottoman Empire did not 
have the same impact on the Muslims as they did on the non-Muslims. Fatma 
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Muge Go<;ek argues that the effects of the reforms on the Ottoman Muslims 
were largely negative. The Muslims interpreted the rights promised to the 
minorities as a loss of their privileged position in the empire. 19 It is this 
feeling of the loss of a privileged position and the "elevation" of the status 
of the non-Muslims that led to the deterioration of interethnic relationships. 
Furthermore, these reforms also had an impact on changing the dynamics 
of power inside the Armenian millet in the Ottoman Empire and culminated 
in the creation of the Armenian National Constitution and the crystalliza-
tion of the Armenian identity. However, for Turkish liberal historiography 
reform also meant international pressure as reform became a strong catalyst 
that "opened the way for the imperialist powers to interfere in the Ottoman 
Empire's internal affairs, and almost every national or religious group would 
ultimately receive patronage and support from one of the Great Powers." 20 
Subsequently, after the Congress of Berlin in 1878 when the Armenian Ques-
tion became internationalized, the issue of reform became a stronger catalyst 
for European pressure. However, the deplorable condition of the periphery 
led the Armenians constantly to demand reforms and appeal to the European 
powers for intervention. Thus, the issue of reform and international intervention 
were important factors that were to haunt the Armenian-Turkish relationship 
until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. 
Economic Advancement and Nationalism 
The Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1838 and various trade agreements with 
European powers in the nineteenth century led to a dramatic increase of Euro-
pean trade in the Ottoman Empire. Foreign trade in the Ottoman provinces 
fell slowly under the monopoly of non-Muslim Ottoman merchants, chiefly 
of Greek and Armenian origin. For Turkish liberal historians economic 
advancement had direct connection with the emergence of nationalism. 
After demonstrating the economic advancement and integration of the 
Armenians in the Ottoman society, Fikret Adamr poses the question, "Why 
did the Armeno-Turkish relationship become catastrophic,?"21 One decisive 
factor that he demonstrates is nationalism. 22 For Halil Berktay, Go<;ek, and 
Adamr commerce had a direct impact on the emergence of Armenian na-
tionalism. Berktay indicates that "trade, the money economy, and capitalism 
first developed among the non-Turkish and non-Muslim population groups 
of the empire. In this way these groups became more open to nationalist 
movements and engaged in struggles against the empire in order to establish 
their own nation states" [ulus devletlerini kurmak is::in].23 However, Go<;ek 
indicates that "Turks and Muslim Arabs did not benefit from the changing 
patterns of commerce as much as the Greeks and Armenians; in the case 
of the Ottoman Turks, the commercial success of the Ottoman minorities 
generated enmity and fostered Turkish nationalism."24 Her observation is im-
portant because it indicates that the economic advancement of the Armenians 
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had a double impact. It not only fostered Armenian nationalism, but Turkish 
reactionary nationalism as well. The various boycotts against the Austrians, 
Greeks, and Armenians in the last decade of the Ottoman Empire enhanced 
the radicalization of the Turkish nationalism, and as Gi1(,'ek indicates, "these 
boycotts led the Unionists to conclude that only a national economy and a 
Turkish bourgeoisie could withstand foreign intervention and domination."" 
In addition, Go(,'ek considers some other factors that played an important role 
as determinants of the structure of nationalisms that emerged in the nineteenth-
century Ottoman Empire.26 These include war and reform movements, the new 
visions of history that emerged in the intelligentsia of the ethnic groups living 
in the Ottoman Empire and finally, their literature and education which gave 
meaning to them. She continues on this point arguing: "The combination of 
war, commerce, and reforms that transformed existing social relations thus 
interacted with new visions painted by history, literature, and education and, 
under the parameters set by the existing organizations of philanthropic and 
secret societies and political parties, determined the patterns the nationalisms 
within the Ottoman empire took." 27 
Revolts and Immigration 
Demographic changes in Anatolia as a result of immigration of Muslims 
from the Balkans and the Caucasus and events taking place in the Balkans had 
an important impact on the deterioration of the Armeno-Turkish relationship. 
It is impossible to examine the historical background of the Armeno-Turkish 
conflict without taking into consideration two important factors: revolts and 
immigration. It is worthy to mention that in a span of twenty years. from 1862 
to 1882, the immigration of the Muslim population from the Bal kans and Rus-
sia increased the Ottoman population by at least 40 percent." A good number 
of these immigrants populated areas where Armenians were living thus creat-
ing population imbalance and consequentially creating tTiction among the 
local populations and the immigrants.29 The special status that the Armenian 
merchants enjoyed under the protection of the European powers led these new 
immigrants, persecuted by the tsarist regime in Russia, to be more antagonistic 
toward the Armenians. It is worth mentioning that the situation in some parts of 
the Anatolian provinces was already deteriorating. Frequent attacks by the Kurd-
ish tribes on the Armenians, heavy taxation, friction with the newly immigrated 
Muslims from the Caucasus and the Balkans, corruption in the administration, 
and failure of Armenian efforts to solve these problems in a diplomatic way led 
to the emergence of Armenian revolutionary groups. The Treaty of San Stefano 
in March 1878 was followed in July by the Treaty of Berlin, considered by the 
Armenians a disastrous diplomatic failure. 
It seems that between 1878 and 1880 there was a major ideological shift 
within the Armenian communities of Anatolia. It is only after 1880 that the 
revolutionary movement emerged in the provinces. The Balkan insurrections 
374 The Armenian Genocide 
on the other hand had an impact on the emergence ofthe Armenian revolution-
ary groupS.30 The nationalist uprising of the Balkan groups, beginning with 
the Serbian revolt of 1804 and culminating belatedly in the Bulgarian revolt of 
1875, had an impact on the Armenians living in Anatolia and shattered all kinds 
of possible unity under the banner of OttomanismY Adamr indicates that the 
beginning of these revolutionary activities in the eastern provinces was aimed 
at resisting the encroachment ofthe Kurdish tribes. However, he indicates that 
with the arrival of the Hnchak and the Dashnaktsutiun (Armenian Revolution-
ary Federation) underground groups the policy changed.32 These organizations, 
he asserts, aimed for the independence of Armenia and acted to gain European 
involvement through the tactic of provocation-massacres-intervention.33 Turkish 
liberal historiography downplays the approach of Armenian historiography to 
these revolutionary groups as pure self-defense units intended to protect the 
Armenian-inhabitedareas from the Kurdish encroachments. For example, Selim 
Deringil argues on this issue, stating that the well-armed Armenian partisan 
groups that were active in Anatolia were more than "self-dcfense units."34 In 
order to understand better the nature of these groups and their relations with the 
Turkish and the Kurdish population, Deringil suggests concentrating more on 
the interethnic periphery relationships. "What were the relations between the 
sedentary Armenian population and the nomadic Kurds, say between 1880 and 
1915?" asks Deringil. "How did the state policy articulate with local balances? 
What were the dimensions of collaboration with Russia?"35 Deringil suggests 
that in order to understand better the breaking points between the Armenians 
and the Turks a considerable initial corpus of micro-level monographic studies 
needs to be conducted.36 Deringil raises an important point here and that is the 
lack of micro-level monographic studies that deal with the Armeno-Turkish 
conflict in particular on the periphery level as most of the studies tend to deal 
more with the diplomatic and political history of the period. 37 
As mentioned, the activities of the guerrillas in the Balkans and the events 
that accompanied the Ottoman defeat by Russia in 1877-78, were hard blows 
to the Ottomanist vision for a fraternal union of the people of the empire. 3x 
Consequently, this led to the immigration of hundreds of thousands of Mus-
lims who were escaping the Russian army or expelled by the Christian state 
and looked for refuge in Asia Minor. Berktay argues that in this period the 
Ottomans tried to repress nationalist uprisings in the Balkans and perpetrated 
massacres. Then Turkish Muslims in the region were massacred and they fled 
as a result to Istanbul and Anatolia.39 Adamr and Berktay highlight the issue of 
the immigration as an important factor in the deterioration of the Armeno-Turk-
ish relationship. According to Berktay, this is an important point because the 
bitterness of the uprisings in the Balkans caused great hatred (biiyiik hir hznr.· 
biriktirdi) and desire for revenge among Turkish Muslims. He continues: "The 
Armenian affair cannot be understood without paying attention to this hatred" 
[Ermeni olaYl bu hznr; birikimi dikkate alznmadan anla§zlamaz].40 
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Oppression 
According to Deringil a "legitimacy crisis" took place in the Ottoman Em-
pire in the second half of the nineteenth century. This legitimacy crisis, which 
had internal and external dimensions, resulted from the challenges of the time. 
Deringil indicates that "by the reign of Abdulhamid. the desire of the state to 
administer and control with hitherto unprecedented intensity led to a situation 
where the role of the center had to be constantly re-defined."41 Onc of the chal-
lenges of the time was the rising Armenian nationalism that was reflectcd in 
the Armenian revolutionary movements. Deringil indicates that as the tension 
between Muslims and Armenians mounted in the 1890s, thc Ottoman ccnter 
became more attentive to the smallest detail that could influence inter-com-
munity relations.42 Furthermore, the center began monitoring every single 
movement regardless if it was by a revolutionary group or a philanthropic one 
that could endanger its entity and hence by taking the necessary measures it 
tried to diminish that threat. For this, Deringil illustrates an interesting example 
of Ottoman counter-espionage against the Hnchak revolutionaries in 1894. 
The counter-espionage took place in the United States in order to monitor the 
activities of the Hnehak party in Boston. The Ottoman government through 
the Turkish consul in Boston tried to enlist an Armenian informant to gather 
information about the activities of the local party organization. In the end, the 
attempt failed as the Armenian informant began to demand higher compensa-
tion.43 The case indicates that the Ottoman government was active internationally 
in monitoring the activities of the other branches of the revol utionary groups 
that were present in the Ottoman Empire. 
Meanwhile, Islam was used by the state as a mobilizing force of solidarity and 
hence for demographic reasons the Muslim immigrants from the Balkans and 
the Caucasus were resettled in Asia Minor, particularly in Armenian-populated 
areas. The resettlement of refugees in these areas played an important role 
in the escalating Armeno-Turkish tensions. Furthermore, in order to combat 
the Russians, in 1891, Sultan Abdul Hamid II created the irregular I/umiciiye 
regiments, primarily from among the Kurds, but as Adamr indicates, "in reality 
these were against the local population, and contributed in deteriorating the 
Armenian situation."44 Deringil, Berktay, and Engin Akarll argue the same. 
According to Deringil: "There was certainly a policy during the Hamidian 
era to use Kurdish tribes as Cossack-inspired irregulars [Hamidiye units] 
against the Armenians, as there was a search for a new base of solidarity on 
a recharged Islamic basis."45 Berktay, on the other hand, highlights the issue 
of irregular troops in his comment on the massacres during the Ilamidian 
period: "In any case, during the 'century of dissolution [t,·iiziihi.) yiizyill]' the 
Ottoman administration repeatedly chose to use not the standing army [diizel1li 
ordudan], but irregulars and undisciplined [diizel1siz gii~-leri] in these affairs, 
relying on their primitiveness and violence."46 This point of irregular troops 
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is an important one that Berktay raises again when discussing the Armenian 
Genocide of 1915. 
In addition, most of these scholars do not see a continuity between the 
Hamidian massacres and the Young Turks policies as it is attested in some trends 
of the Armenian historiography on the Armenian Genocide.47 Deringil on this 
point indicates that the "Hamidian policies of ad hoc, semiofficial and official 
massacres were qualitatively different from the systematic persecution carried 
out in the Young Turk era."4X Similarly, Akarh indicates the need to distinguish 
between Abdul Hamid's relatively measured repression of the Armenians and 
the annihilative policies of the Committee of Union and Progress (Young Turks). 
He continues on this point saying: "For all his faults, Abdulhamid felt more 
bound by certain traditions of statecraft, which should help explain why the 
Ottoman state lasted so long on such wide-flung territories."49 
Causation and Contextualization 
In discussing premeditation, implementation, and aftermath in the narrative 
of Turkish liberal historiography, it is necessary to consider the issue of causation 
and contextualization in Armeno-Turkish relations. Generally speaking, causal 
relations exist between events, that is, if event A occurs, then event B follows, 
and "it can be reasonably demonstrated that event A explains the subsequent 
(temporal sequential) occurrence of event B."so Some historians tend to place 
an emphasis on causation. Noted British historian E. H. Carr, for example, 
maintained that the study of history is the study of causes.SI Carr elaborates 
further on this point: "The relation of the historian to his causes has the same 
dual and reciprocal character as the relation of the historian to his facts. The 
causes determine his interpretation ofthe historical process, and his interpreta-
tion determines his selection and marshalling of the causes. The hierarchy of 
causes, the relative significance of one cause or set of causes or of another, is 
the essence of his interpretation."s2 Thus, the hierarchy of causes is the essence 
of interpretation. 
Hayden White has a different perception. For him, focusing on the causes 
of an event "fails to recognize the variety of narratives that can be told and that 
themselves prefigure the type of causal connections to be made."s3 Because, as 
Alan Munslow states, "White sees history as a literary artifact, he believes that 
historians make causal links as part of their overall constitution and prefigura-
tion of the historical field through the exercise of their historical imagination 
and the employment of trope, emplotment, argument, ideological preference 
and philosophical orientation."s4 
As stated, Turkish liberal historiography tends to represent the historical 
background ofthe Armeno-Turkish conflict by using causal relations. Thus, for 
example, if there had been no Armenian economic advancement there would 
not have been the growth of nationalism, and if there had been no resettlement 
policy in the Armenian provinces there would not have been ethnic friction, 
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and ifthere had been no revolt there would not have been oppression, and so 
forth. The use of causal relations by Turkish liberal historiography in explaining 
the historical events of 1915 limits the variety of other narratives explaining 
those events. 
The employment of causal relationships in Turkish liberal historiography 
raises the concept of contextualization. Although, in such horrendous events 
such as genocide, contextualization may help to explain the crime. it might also 
demonstrate its inevitability and minimize the level of the catastrophe. Thus, 
a scholar is faced with the dilemma of reconstructing the past through the in-
tegral use of causal relations and through contextualization and normalization 
of the event to give it proper historical meaning but without losing the ethical 
component. G6<;ek captures this dilemma with the following words: 
If! contextualize the massacres of 1915 in my historiography, as I have. within a long 
Turkish nationalist period that ends up normalizing 1915 and thereby. by implication. 
mitigating and obliterating the trauma associated with 1915, then I need to critically 
discuss the location of 1915 in and itself to address this possibility. For I am doubly 
implicated, not only as a scholar but also as a Turk. It is therefore particularly impera-
tive for me to acknowledge that I as a Turkish scholar convey the critical stand I take 
in relation to 1915 in the historical narrative I construct. 
What G6<;ek argues is that it is not contextualization and the ensuing normal-
ization of the event that is problematic rather its uncritical manner. She continues 
on this point: "What is at issue then is the ethics one employs in undertaking 
the contextualization." 55 So how should scholars approach a subject such as 
genocide? Based on Dominick LaCapra,56 G6<;ek suggests that the scholar 
should engage in a strategic negotiation with the trauma and its historical actors: 
"The conventional distance scholars place between themselves and their texts is 
no longer there; the strategic negotiation enables the scholar to do a couple of 
things simultaneously: he captures the complexity ofthe trauma, contextualize 
it without normalizing it, and by reflecting on his own subject position during 
this process, is able to clarify his ethical stand in relation to the trauma." 
Premeditation-Implementation-Aftermath 
Turkish liberal historiography examines the concepts of premeditation, 
implementation, and aftermath through the lens of the second constitutional 
period (l90S-1S).57In other words, the second constitutional period becomes the 
ultimate tool for the contextualization of the historical event of 1915. Although 
the contribution of Turkish liberal historiography on the historical event of 1915 is 
still in its infancy,58 the phase leading to the second constitutional period has been 
examined thoroughly by shedding new light in particular on the Armeno-Turkish 
relationship in the pre-revolution era and the level of their cooperation. 
In a painstaking study,Siikrii Hanioglu has demonstrated the relationship 
of the Young Turks with the Armenians, in particular with the Armenian 
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Revolutionary Federation, which was more inclined to Prince Sabaheddin's 
decentralization ideology.59 Furthermore, Hanioglu has demonstrated that the 
relationship between the Young Turks and the Dashnaktsutiun was not great 
because they disagreed on a number of points, especially the issues of foreign 
intervention and decentralization.6°Though in the first congress of the Ottoman 
oppositional groups in 1902 the relationship of the Armenians with the Young 
Turks was tense,6] between 1905 and 1907, the relationship between the Young 
Turks and the Dashnaktsutiun improved, and as a result of Sabaheddin Bey's 
efforts, the two sides reached a serious agreement for the first time in the his-
tory of the Young Turk movement. 62 Consequently, the Dashnaktsutiun began 
to take part in the revolutionary propaganda that was not only confined to the 
Armenian circles; rather it appealed also to the Turkish circles inviting them to 
common action.63 Furthermore, bogus organizations were formed in order to 
maximize the spectrum of the revolution. The most important of these bogus 
organizations established by the Dashnaktsutiun was the so-called Turkish 
Allied Party. Hanioglu indicates that the real object of the Dashnaktsutiun, a 
rapprochement between Turks and Armenians, became the most common theme 
in the Turkish Allied Party's propaganda.64 
Regardless of the level of cooperation, the selective Anneno-Turkish coopera-
tion against the regime of Abdul Hamid II is an important point that contradicts 
the official Turkish history (resmi tarih) , which contends that the Armenian 
revolutionary activities, in particular those of the Dashnaktsutiun against Abdul 
Hamid, were rebellious acts aimed at the establishment of an independent Ar-
menia and disregards Armenian cooperation with the Young Turks whose goals 
were the overthrow of the oppressive sultan's regime and reinstatement of the 
Ottoman constitution. 65 Despite this fact, two main issues remained as serious 
obstacles in the Armeno-Turkish relationships: decentralization and international 
intervention. It is no surprise that the Armenians like the Arabs and the Albanians 
were more inclined to Prince Sabaheddin because of his decentralized approach 
influenced by the theories of Demolins.66 This is also evident in the Armenian 
press in the post-revolution period by the entrance of Sabaheddin to Istanbul. 
Hanioglu indicates that following his failure to interest the Armenian commit-
tees, some of which were bargaining with Sabaheddin at the same time, Behaed-
din Shakir 67 decided to abandon his grandiose scheme of uniting all the Young 
Turks, Ahmed lelaleddin Pasha, and the Annenian committees in an organization 
that would in reality be under his control.68 The result was that the organization 
adopted the name the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress),69 Behaeddin 
Shakir became responsible for the creation of four independent divisions of the 
central committee, a fact that according to Hanioglu helped Behaeddin Shakir to 
gain the upper hand in the organization and made him the hidden leader of the 
new organization.70 What is the significance of Behaeddin Shakir in the central 
committee after the revolution? To what extent did Behaeddin Shakir manipulate 
this role in the liquidation process of the Armenians in 1915? 
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As mentioned, between 1905 and 1907, relations between the Young Turks 
and the Dashnaktsutiun improved. This led the Armenian party to take a more 
active role in a second congress of Ottoman oppositional parties in 1907. The 
CUP, Prince Sabaheddin's League of Private Initiative and Decentralization, and 
the Dashnaktsutiun,jointly organized that congress in which general agreement 
was reached among the three committees.7! According to Hanioglu. "the Year 
1908 thus opened with a tactical alliance in place among three opposition com-
mittees. For those who had witnessed the endless debates between the leaders 
of the Dashnaktsutiun and the CUP .. , this seemed a considerable success."c, 
To what extent was this cooperation between the Dashnaktsutiun and the CUP 
productive or vital for the realization of the Young Turk revolution'? To what 
extent was this cooperation sincere? To what extent did the Young Turks trust the 
Armenians? Hanioglu comments on this point, saying: "The CPU [CUP] papers 
and available Ottoman documents reveal that the joint CPU-Dashnaktsutiun 
revolutionary activities were very insignificant and that the CPU never trusted 
the Dashnaktsutiun .... The CPU alliance with the Dashnaktsutiun played no role 
whatsoever in that revolution and was for practical purposes almost worthless."-' 
This indicates the level of the distrust that existed between the Committee or 
Union and Progress and the Dashnaktsutiun, the only Armenian party cooperat-
ing with the CUP Why did the Young Turks not have sincere confidence in the 
non-Muslim elements, in particular the Armenians'? According to Ak"am, the 
Young Turks looked no more favorably on other non-Muslim elements living 
in the Ottoman Empire. In the Young Turks' view the non- M usl ims represented 
a potential threat that would or could split the empire."4 
The Young Turk revolution of 1908 brought with it hopes of freedom and 
equality. It was with the reinstatement of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876 that a 
new phase began in the Ottoman Empire and which ended in the collapse of the 
empire after World War 1. This phase was characterized by overlapping "isms," 
identities, and loyalties, ranging from Ottomanism to Islam ism. Turkisl11. and 
Arabism. This phase was also characterized by immense international pressure 
on the Ottoman Empire, loss of territories, and mounting pol iticization of the 
ethnic boundaries. 
The hopes for the ideal Ottoman society based on equality and justice after 
the post-revolutionary period under the banner of Ottoman ism began to fade as 
a result of political ruptures in this process. One ofthe most important ruptures 
was the counterrevolution of 1909, which was initiated by the reactionary forces 
in the Ottoman Empire. The counterrevolution, widely known as the 3 J Marl 
olaylan (the March 31 incidents), and the accompanying massacres in Adana and 
throughout Cilicia had a tremendous impact on disrupting the equilibrium of this 
transitional period. Most Turkish liberal historians fai I to address this important 
point.75 Although the Cilician massacres were not the ultimate manirestation or 
the radicalization of Turkish nationalism,7!> they opened a serious gap between 
the Armenians and the Turks. For 1110st of the Turkish liberal historians it was the 
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Balkan wars that led to the radicalization of Turkish nationalism and a drastic 
change in the government's policy toward the Christian elements living in the 
empire, in particular the Armenians. Adamr comments on this issue: 
The Balkan wars (1912 and 1913) constituted a turning point in thc cvolution of the 
relationship between the Young Turks and the Armenians. Two changes of political 
direction seem to be significant in this regard: the first turning point is seen in the new 
conception of the CUP about the national question. Confronted with a new wave of 
Muslim refugees coming from the Balkan, the majority of the Young Turks abandoned 
their egalitarian Ottomanist attitude and began to utilize the demands of the Muslims 
in a campaign of defamation of the non-Muslim populations .... 
The second turning point took place within the Armenian camp. After the disas-
trous Ottoman defeat in the Balkan wars and the fact that certain promises of the 
Young Turks-such as those concerning the issue of the Armenian territories-did 
not materialize, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation decided to place again the 
solution of the Armenian Question in the hands of the Great Powers. 77 
According to Adamr, this consequentially led to a grave crisis in the Young 
Turk-Armenian relationship in 1913-14.78 
Rejecting the view that it was during the Balkan wars that Turkish national-
ism began to be radicalized, Hanioglu, utilizing the private papers of several 
secretaries of the CUP's secret central committee, maintains that the CUP was a 
more intensely Turkish nationalist organization from an earlier date than many 
historians have thought. 79 Commenting on this point, he writes: "It is obvious 
that the Young Turks had strong nationalistic feelings even before the Young 
Turk revolution of 1908. Contrary to commonly held views, this policy did not 
begin after the Balkan wars of 1912-1913."80 So, if Turkish nationalism was 
evident even before the 1908 revolution, does this mean that there was a long-
term plan by Turkish nationalists to establish a Turanic empire in which the 
Armenians were considered to be a huge impediment for the realization of this 
ideology and does this mean that Pan-Turkism was the ultimate motive behind 
the Armenian Genocide? Most Turkish liberal historians refute Pan-Turkism as 
the ultimate ideology or the motive behind the annihilation of the Armenians. 81 
Akarh comments on this point saying: "Since they are called 'Young Turks' by 
common convention, and because some of them sometimes sang songs of a 
mythical 'Turan' or Pan-Turkish state, we cannot jump at the conclusion that 
they thus wanted to get rid of all the Armenians once and for all to clear the 
way to the Turan. If the UPP [Union and Progress Party] leadership agreed on 
anything, it was the preservation of Ottoman state as a centralized structure, 
however much of it could be preserved, and at whatever COSt."82 
The issue of Turkification or centralization still remains a lively debate 
among Turkish liberal scholars. So what was the motive behind the Armenian 
Genocide? AkGam argues that the feeling of vengeance, formed among Ottoman 
Turkish officials as a result of continual territorial losses, was largely directed 
at the non-Muslim minorities, "the "servants of yesterday," who lived on these 
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lands. And during World War I this revenge, which could not have been taken 
against the Bulgarians or the Greeks, was instead taken out against the "ungrate-
ful" Armenians, who, by "collaborating with the imperialists, struck us from 
behind."83 Ak<;am continues on this issue stating: "In short, the ruling members 
of an Empire that was continually losing territories, that stood on the verge of 
collapse, perceived the national and democratic demands of their Christian 
subjects through the psychoses of isolation, fear and annihilation, and adopted 
an approach to them that was in line with these feelings."x4 
According to Berktay and Ak<;am, it is this feeling of "total annihilation" that 
led the military dictatorship of the CUP to take such a drastic step especially 
after the Armenian demands for reform. gS Ak<;am continues on this issue stating 
that the ruling members of the empire approached these national demands with 
the understanding that they would have to conduct a "war for survival." And 
the only way to win this "war of survival" was through the homogenization of 
troubled, heterogeneous areas. 86 I think that the concept of ' 'total annihilation" or 
"war for survival" should be understood more as wartime rhetoric manipulatcd 
by the CUP for the justification ofthe annihilation of the Armenians rather than 
reflecting the "true" feelings of the CUP leadership. Regarding the premeditation 
issue, Ak<;am demonstrates that the decision for the annihilation of the Arme-
nians was taken in March 1915, when a clandestine decision was made against 
the Armenians and Behaeddin Shakir was tasked with its implementation.x~ 
Ak<;am, Berktay, and Deringil believe that the decision t(lr the annihilation of 
the Armenians was given orally to the regions. xx Berktay argucs that in the orders 
for deportation there was no mention of massacre (kat!lam) and mass murder 
(kmm). However, at the same time, separate unwritten special orders were givcn 
(ayn ve yazlL almayan ozel emirler verilmi~·tir) to the most rapacious members 
of the Special Organization (Te.ykilat-i Mahsusa) who "worshipcd violence and 
were not bound to any moral codes" [hi(:bir toplumsal ahlak kaytdlyla bag/i 
almayan]. 89 In the arguments of Ak<;am, Berktay, and Deringil, one notices a 
special emphasis on the Special Organization and the total exclusion of the Ot-
toman army from the responsibility of the Genocide. [sn 't the army at the end 
ofthe day the symbol of the state'? Wasn't this army the one who waged the War 
of Independence that led to the establishment of the Turkish republic? Ak<;am 
sees a strong relationship between the Armenian Genocide and the foundation 
ofthe Turkish republic: "I think the main reason the Turks avoid any discussion 
on history and make it a taboo lies in the reality of this connection between thc 
Armenian Genocide and the foundation of the Turkish Rcpublic.''')'' 
Ayhan Aktar has demonstrated that this taboo was discussed in the Ottoman 
Parliament long before the foundation of the Turkish republic.')] [n dealing with 
the Ottoman parliamentary debates of 1918, Aktar emphasizes that no one from 
the Ottoman deputies at that time has shed any doubt about the actuality of 
the mass murder. By using the terminology imha edilmek (to be annihilated), 
cinayeti azime (macabre murder), Ermeni kltalt (Armenian massacre), and 
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Ermenifaciasz (Armenian catastrophe), the Ottoman Parliament confirmed that 
"crimes against humanity" had been committed against the Armenians during 
the world war. Aktar draws the following conclusions: 
I. The deputies in the Ottoman Parliament, Muslim and non-Muslim, did not 
enter a mode of saying: "this matter [massacres] did not take place and all the 
sayings are false" (bu i~ almamz~'tzr, soylenenlerin hepsi yalandzr). However, 
the proposals brought by Ottoman deputies of Armenian and Greek origins to 
punish those responsible met with obstacles, as the deputies ofthe Committee 
of Union and Progress were a majority in the Parliament.92 
2. The CUP deputies, on the one hand, were saying, that "Turks also died" 
and the minority deputies, on the other hand, were saying that the bandit orga-
nizations (rete yonetimi) were responsible for the massacre and asked for their 
punishment; 
3. The current debates surrounding the Armenian deportation revolve around 
two poles: on the one hand, there are those who adhere to the premeditated 
character of an organized "genocide" and, on the other hand, there are those who 
justify expulsions of hundreds of thousands of people as a simple administra-
tive measure necessitated by the wartime conditions (~avas s,artlarznzn geregi 
alan bas it bir idari tedbir). 
Aktar summarizes: "And within this polarized context of 'blacks and whites,' 
it becomes almost impossible to maintain an academic discussion. In this cli-
mate the voices of social scientists who are seeking truth in 'gray zones' [gri 
alanlarda] are intimidated into silence and are asked to be condemned by the 
law of 'national treachery' [hzyaneti vataniye]."93 
The most recent incident of this sort is that of the conference organized by 
Bosporus (Bogazi9i), Bilgi, and Sabancl universities and entitled "Ottoman 
Armenians during the Era of Imperial Decline: Academic Responsibility and 
Issues of Democracy" which had been scheduled to take place at Bosporus 
University during May 25-27, 2005. The conference was deferred because of 
the strong reactions of the government and both the ruling and the opposition 
parties. Following Minister of Justice Cemil <;:igek's characterization of the 
conference "as a treason against Turkey" [Tiirkiye 'ye hzyanet alarak] , Bosporus 
University announced the postponement of the conference. 94 However, after 
weeks of deliberations and numerous attempts by the Turkish government to 
block the conference, it was held on September 24-25 at Bilgi University.95 The 
conference is considered an important step for Turkish liberal historiography, 
because for the first time since the founding of the Turkish republic in 1923, 
a meeting within a Turkish university questioned the state narrative on one of 
the most sensitive issues-the Armenian Genocide, whether or not it was given 
that name. 
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Conclusion 
In historical narrative it is "narrativity" that, as Paul RicocLir puts it, "brings 
us back from within-time-ness to historicality, from 'reckoning with' timc to 
'recollecting' it."96 This chapter has attempted to assess the "recollecting" of 
Turkish liberal historiography of an important event in the history of the Ot-
toman Empire and modern Turkey. In doing so, it has shown that the narrative 
of Turkish liberal historiography is not as monolithic as the narrative of the 
resmi tarih (official history). Despite having some commonalities with the 
Armenian historiography, Turkish liberal historiography still provides different 
perspectives to understanding the Armenian Genocide. Moreover, Turkish liberal 
historiography in its historical explanation ofthe event tends to deal more with 
causal relations by using contextualization as a tool. In studying horrendous 
events such as genocides, contextualization may yield a better understanding 
of the event, but it might also tend to demonstrate its inevitabi I ity and thereby 
minimize the level ofthe catastrophe. In addition, mostTurkish liberal historians 
refrain from dealing directly with the mechanism of the event itsel( as they 
tend to describe the macro-history ofthe event rather than dealing with it on the 
micro-level. Turkish liberal historiography on the Armenian (ienocide is still in 
its infancy, because a Turkish critical approach to the history of Turkey and the 
Ottoman Empire in general is still on the threshold of achieving what Gli<,:ek 
calls "post-nationalist critical narrative." One also need not forget that the task 
of Turkish liberal historians, in particular those who "venture into the minefield" 
or roam in the "gray zones," is an intricate one. Through workshops, dialogues, 
and conferences Turkish liberal historiography can be fostered. Moreover, such 
events must focus first and foremost on Turkish society through publishing 
their proceedings in Turkish translation in order to promote the "narratives of 
society" that challenge the "state narrative.",!7 
Turkey today is standing on the threshold of entering the European Union. 
Some will argue that this move will yield positive outcomes for Turkish liberal 
historiography. However, the ongoing massive campaign by the Turkish gov-
ernment, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkll1ma Partisi or 
AKP), and the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi or CHPj, 
both against the Armenian "claims" and the Turkish "collaborators," conveys 
another message. 
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